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ON THE POSSIBILITY OF VALUES TRANSLATION  
IN THE GLOBAL WORLD
Chiara Certomà
In my discussion I make some speci!c remarks on Wong’s, Bre-
sciani’s and Friese’s contributions and offer further considerations on 
the conference’s topic.
Wong’s and Bresciani’s papers are challenging because they re-
quire us to think about universalism from the other side of the coin. We 
are used to considering universalism as characterising western culture1 
and these presentations overturned our point of view and explained how 
the universalism of New Confucianism could indeed be a different uni-
versalism and teach or enlighten the western world.
Some of the !ve points of the New Confucianism Manifesto pre-
sented by Wong, are, in my opinion, worthy of further investigation. 
Furthermore, because I think there are some similarities between the 
Manifesto’s and Qian Mu’s considerations about the western world, pro-
posed by Bresciani, I will point this out when appropriate in this paper.
The !rst point of the Manifesto suggests that the West is charac-
terised by the pursuit of progress – a pursuit not founded on the ideal of 
unchanging security and tradition. This feature is presented as if it was 
in opposition with the Chinese culture which is said to base all values 
on the moral conscience, which is self-suf!cient. On this point, I have 
two concerns. First, it cannot be ignored that the discontents about the 
progress in the West produce (and produced) criticisms and oppositions 
“from the inside”, so that a monolithic view of western society is, prob-
ably, inappropriate. Second, I wonder wheatear the Chinese world is re-
ally able to completely distanciate itself from the pursuit of progress. If 
 1 This point is particularly evident in the debate about the character of Human 
Rights, that have been widely criticised for putting forward a “thick” form of western 
universalism. This criticism has not only been addressed by non-western scholars, but 
also from some well-reputed western thinkers, such as Richard Rorty. A good example 
on the contrasting argumentations can be found in S. SHUTE-S. HURLEY (eds.), On Hu-
man Rights: the Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993, Basic Books, New York 1993.
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we visualise the skylines of the biggest Chinese cities and we compare 
them with those of western cities, it may seem that China is in the similar 
business of pursuing progress as the Western world is. I wonder if the 
underlying reasons which support Chinese efforts toward (what I would 
exactly de!ne) “progress” is exclusively supported by self-reward, abne-
gation and no interest in personal “external accomplishments”. I fear the 
lack of interest in self-reward narrative to be a sort of tale that China tells 
itself as comfort in the face of change, so that it can pretend that noth-
ing is really changing despite the obvious radical transformation of its 
society and economy. Perhaps, it is possible to claim Chinese interest in 
economic, technological and !nancial growth is the result of contamina-
tion with the West, but in this case, I !nd particularly ambiguous Qian 
Mu’s statement that China has to succeed whatever Western culture has 
– and get better results.
This point is, in my view, related to the author’s idea that West-
ern culture is primarily concerned with speedy ef!ciency while China is 
an easy-going society. This af!rmation is resonant with Bresciani’s de-
scription of Chinese people as self-satis!ed, peace-loving, and capable 
of harmonizing different cultures. I suppose that being concerned with 
speed or being an easy-going is not something that pertains to different 
geographical and political unities (i.e. China, Europe, U.S. …); rather it 
is a feature that can be associated with different kinds of places exist-
ing worldwide. This is evident in the consideration that megalopolis are 
pretty everywhere concerned with speed, while small villages or coun-
tryside are pretty everywhere easy-going places2.
About the second point of the Manifesto, I do agree that concepts 
can effectively be an obstacle to communication because they are sepa-
rated from actual life. However, I wonder if we can posit a different 
solution for capturing “actual life” than the one suggested by New Con-
fucianism, i.e. the oriental “wisdom of void” or the “giving up every-
thing”. I think we could move away from the assumption that languages 
carry with them universes of meanings, history, behaviours, etc.; we can’t 
easily grasp them in a single bunch of sounds, and this dif!culty makes 
communication such a dif!cult task and translation even more dif!-
cult. The belief that there is no way to get into another’s mind, no way 
to represent another’s mental state – especially when conceptualised in 
 2 On a non-nation based geography of globalisation, SASKIA SASSEN’s Cities in a 
World Economy (Pine Forge Press, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2006) can be usefully consid-
ered.
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another language – may lead to sometime radical relativism, notably ex-
pressed in Wittgenstein’s statement that «the limits of my language are 
the limits of my word»3. This belief was at the very origin of the scepti-
cal theories about our representational capability and intrinsic indeter-
minacy of translation4. This is what the young girl of So!a Coppola’s 
!lm, Lost in Translation5, experiences when she is completely wrapped 
up in the search for a key to understand Japanese life, but she can’t get 
it. This approach claims that translating is not just a matter of having a 
comparable signi!er in different languages. In fact, even if we had it, we 
could not refer it to any common underlying signi!ed – i.e. there is no 
common base for the signi!ed 6.
As a result, it seems evident that, if we get entrapped in a lan-
guage-game, we will have no chance to understand each other. None-
theless, as Wittgenstein himself declared, the «term “language-game” is 
meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is 
part of an activity»7. The fact itself that language is an activity (a game 
to be precise) opens up the possibility for everybody to take part in it, 
without having a deep comprehension of its hidden mechanisms and 
structures. The game can be played only the base of the daily and com-
mon practices.
In my reading of Wittgenstein’s theory, this would give us better 
opportunities to understand each other on the basis of practices rather 
than on language translation alone. After all, agreement, Wittgenstein 
writes, is «on forms of life, or better, on practices constituting speci!c 
procedure inscribed in shared forms of life»8. As a consequence, I won-
der if we can overcome the obstacle to communication, determined by 
the use of concepts, by building up our communication on the practices 
of actual life.
The !fth point of the Manifesto reminds us that, according to the 
New Confucianism, the whole world is like one family. This is a state-
ment we can all agree about, in general; but the problem of universal 
 3 L. WITTGENSTEIN, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Routledge and Paul, London 
1961, 5.6.
 4 For instance, see W.V. QUINE, Word and Object, The MIT Press, Cambridge 
(MA) 1960.
 5 So!a Coppola, Lost in translation, 2003.
 6 On signi!ed and signi!er, the basic reference is F. DE SAUSSURE’s, Course in 
General Linguistics, Open Court, La Salle (IL) 1983.
7 L. WITTGENSTEIN, Philosophical investigations, Blackwell, Oxford 2006, I, 23.
8 L. WITTGENSTEIN, Philosophical investigations, cit., I, 241.
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statements of peace, love, respect, solidarity etc. is exactly that we can 
share them only with those who agree to share them with us. So, what 
about the huge number of people in the world that do not wish to be-
come one family with you and me? I consider this to be one of the big-
gest issue of multiculturalists research today. The point is not only to be 
able to integrate “the others” with us, but to !nd better ways to co-exist 
with those who are not willing to be “integrated”9.
Friese’s contribution proposes an accurate reconstruction of 
the European identity formation by claiming that, despite the reduc-
tio ad unum of a speci!c socio-cultural imagination, the West is not a 
monolithic structure determined by inner unity and opposed to other 
monolithic structures. Rather, it is the outcome of several different par-
ticularities and otherness that coalesce or run parallel over time.
I absolutely agree. I think, again, we can make similar assumptions 
about non-western geographical identities too, which can be seen as the 
«location of the intersections of particular bundles of activity spaces, of 
connections and interrelations, of in"uences and movements»10. Some-
time we are not able to appreciate how heterogeneous “other” socio-
cultural identities are, because we are not used to or educated about 
others’ differences (different people, traditions, languages, alphabets 
etc…) that overlap in the non-western world. Indeed, every culture has 
its own identity and its own differences, i.e. what is different inside the 
culture is sometimes only seen by the insiders as the social and cultural 
politics of that culture.
Friese reminds us that for a long time social sciences demarcated 
otherness, not only by setting ad hoc spatial borders, but by instrumen-
tally adopting a speci!c view of different temporalities. She recalls Fabi-
an’s work. Fabian suggests that in a linear view of societal development, 
different political subjectivities are seen as belonging to different epochs. 
The other’s identity is crystallised as belonging to different historical 
times which do not exist anymore in our perception. This means that 
they are essentialised in a sort of a-temporal time, a time out of history. 
Fabian explains that, despite scholars having acknowledged coevalness 
as a condition for the understanding of other cultures, nonetheless in 
their !nal productions (diaries, descriptions, analysis etc.), they tend to 
 9 B. HENRY-A. PIRNI, La via identitaria al multiculturalismo. Charles Taylor e ol-
tre, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli 2006.
10 D. MASSEY-P. JESS, Places and cultures in an uneven world, in D. Massey-P. Jess 
(eds.), A Place in the World?, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995, p. 59.
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ignore or forgot their experience of coevalness, by not integrating expe-
rience and science, research and writing11. In order to solve the coeval-
ness impasse, according to Fabian, structuralist scholars eliminate time, 
allowing difference over time to be “absorbed” by space, a tabular space 
of anthropological classi!cation. As a consequence, the relation between 
the West and the Others is conceived not in terms of difference but in 
terms of distance. 
However, I would like to move the argument forward to some 
degree. It should be admitted that it is not the arrival of what Fabian 
called «the margins» (a spatial metaphor, indeed) that disrupts the an-
thropological representation of our time-space; rather it is the arrival 
of people “from the past” which produces our sense of disorientation. 
Migration, for instance, is «an assertion of coevalness»12. By associating 
the geographical remoteness from us (i.e., the centre of narrative produc-
tion) with a temporal remoteness, the suppression of concomitant effects 
of spatial difference are convened under the discourse of temporal se-
quence13. Geographical differences are practically interpreted as a ques-
tion of backwardness, instead of co-production of different trajectories. 
In political terms «the repression of the spatial was bound up with the 
establishment of foundational universals (and vice versa), the repression 
of the possibility of multiple trajectories, and the denial of the real dif-
ference of the others»14.
Nonetheless, because in the globalised world time is “condensed” 
in space, we need to value coevalness: side by side we may easily !nd out 
in a single fraction of space, the Middle-Ages and Science-Fiction (fast 
becoming Science-Fact!). It’s not just, as someone would call it a «time-
space compression»15, due to globalization (speed communication, speed 
travelling etc.) but it’s a new horizon that requires us to deal with differ-
ent geographies and different histories at once.
11 He writes: «The usual coeval, and especially the noun coevalness, express a 
need to steer between such closely related notions as synchronous/simultaneous and con-
temporary. […] The term coevalness was chosen to mark a central assumption, namely 
that all temporal relations, and therefore also contemporaneity, are embedded in cultur-
ally organized praxis.» (J. FABIAN, Time and the other, Columbia University Press, New 
York 1983, p. 34).
12 D. MASSEY, For space, Sage, London 2005, p. 70.
13 D. MASSEY, Spaces of politics, in D. Massey-J. Allen-P. Sarre (eds.), Human Ge-
ography Today, Polity Press, Cambridge 1999, p. 284.
14 D. MASSEY, For space, cit., p. 70.
15 A. GIDDENS, The consequences of modernity, Stanford University Press, Stan-
ford 1990.
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Finally, I would comment on Friese’s paragraphs about the post-
modern loss of place as a metaphor for the loss of culture. In the post-
modern approach spatial de!nitions (deterritorialization, displacement, 
diasporas, nomadology, migration, travel-crossing, etc.) permeate dis-
courses on globalisation, by opposing the global, i.e. the space of agency, 
and the local, including the place of traditions. The view of local places 
as opposed to global space is quite widespread. Manuel Castell describes 
this dichotomy by introducing the term "ux space. Flux space is the 
global space of networks that opposes the place space, which is associated 
with territorial and physical space. Castell af!rms global modernity to 
be characterised by the concentration of wealth, power and information 
in "uxes rather than in places, so that the primacy of the global over the 
local is unavoidable16.
On the nature of this opposition I have a different opinion. Instead 
of adopting such a sharp separation between the global and the local 
can’t we just propose we experience life in «"uid space»17 where local 
and global have fuzzy borders? Thus, places are neither the victims of 
the globalisation, nor sanctuaries against the global. If so, a fundamen-
talist sense of place would be dif!cult to support, because places will 
be seen as «criss-crossing in the wider geometries that constitute both 
themselves and the global»18.
Following this argumentation, we could focus our attention on the 
role of places in political struggles. Some anthropologists declare that 
they are not worried about the opening of borders in the global age; 
rather they fear the elimination of borders corresponding to a denial of 
localisation, not in terms of defending nationalistic and chauvinist inter-
ests, but as creating so much fuzziness that diverse others do not get the 
chance to compare and learn about the others in their world, as a result 
of the “haze” caused by globalisation19. By opposing the rhetoric of a de-
territorialising globalisation, Arturo Escobar af!rms that places are still 
a core element in constituting collective identity: «There is an “emplace-
ment” that counts for more than we want to acknowledge, which makes 
one ponder the idea of “getting back into place”»20. This explains why
16 M. CASTELL, The Power of Identity: The Information Age – Economy, Society 
and Culture, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford 1998.
17 J. MURDOCH, Post-structuralist Geography, Sage, London 2006.
18 D. MASSEY, For space, cit., p. 101.
19 A. ESCOBAR, Culture Sits in Places: Re"ections on Globalism and Subaltern Strat-
egies of Localization, in «Political geography», vol. 20, n. 2, 2001.
20 A. ESCOBAR, art. cit., p. 2.
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People continue […] to be grounded in local socio-natural practices, 
no matter how changing and hybridized those grounds and practices might 
turn out to be. To capture the place specificity of the production of place and 
culture thus becomes the other side of the necessary reconceptualization of 
culture as deterritorialized and transnationally produced21.
Even in the global world, local places seem to still have a chance 
to be vital and dynamic because they are spaces of daily life, power gen-
eration, novelty emergence and tradition contestation. What we are as-
sisting today, worldwide, is a reassertion of places and the production 
of a global sense of place22.
21 A. ESCOBAR, art. cit., p. 6.
22 D. MASSEY, Global sense of place, in «Marxism Today», Jun 1991.
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